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IS SILENCE STILL GOLDEN? THE
IMPLICATIONS OF BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS
ON THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
Brigitte Mills*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins1 chips
further away at the already tattered principles and protections
originally announced in the Court’s 1966 landmark decision in
Miranda v. Arizona.2 The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.”3 In Miranda, the Court found that the
inherently coercive pressures of in-custody interrogation might
compel a suspect to violate his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.4 To help prevent violations of this constitutional right,
the Miranda Court held that law enforcement officials must apprise
the suspect of his rights by way of certain warnings.5 These warnings
are not guaranteed constitutional rights themselves but serve to
safeguard those eminently important substantive rights6 and are an
“absolute prerequisite to interrogation.”7 No inculpatory statements
elicited during a custodial interrogation may be offered against the

* J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles, magna cum laude and Order of the Coif. I
would like to thank Professor Marcy Strauss for her invaluable guidance and input on this
comment. I would also like to give my deepest thanks to the entire staff of the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review, especially the inimitable Elena Grieco, for her support, patience, and keen
eye throughout the editing process.
1. 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
5. See id. at 471. These now-famous warnings must inform the suspect that he has the right
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him, and that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney during questioning. Id.
6. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994).
7. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471.
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suspect unless the suspect was first advised of his rights.8
Miranda warnings do more than merely inform suspects of their
rights. The Miranda Court found that these warnings protect a
suspect from the “inherently compelling pressures” of interrogation.9
First, after the warnings have been given, if the suspect “in any
manner”10 indicates that he wishes to remain silent or that he wishes
to consult an attorney, all questioning must cease.11 Alternatively, if
the suspect does not invoke his rights and the interrogation
continues, the government shoulders a “heavy burden” to show that
the suspect “knowingly and intelligently” waived his rights.12
Miranda made clear that “a valid waiver will not be presumed
simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or
simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually
obtained.”13
The Miranda Court announced these broad principles regarding
the right against self-incrimination but provided merely a blueprint
of the right’s scope. In fact, the Miranda Court left the question for a
future Court to fill in the rule’s precise contours. As discussed below,
the Court has retreated from the broad principles originally
announced in Miranda, and the rules that have developed through
Miranda’s progeny bear little resemblance to the original decision.14
This Comment discusses the decision in Berghuis v.
Thompkins15 and the role the decision plays in further diminishing the
broad protections established in Miranda. Part II provides a summary
of the factual and procedural background of the Thompkins decision.
Part III discusses the reasoning of the majority and dissenting
opinions. Finally, Part IV discusses how the decision’s broad holding
is a departure from the Court’s precedents and how it greatly
undermines a suspect’s exercise of his constitutionally guaranteed
rights.
8. See id. at 444.
9. Id. at 467.
10. See id. at 473–74.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 475.
13. Id.
14. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court—October Term 2009 Foreword: Conservative
Judicial Activism, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 813, 832–33.
15. 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Samuel Morris died from multiple gunshot wounds sustained
outside a mall in Southfield, Michigan, on January 10, 2000.16 One of
the suspects, Van Chester Thompkins, fled the scene.17 He was
arrested in Ohio about one year later.18 Two officers from Michigan
traveled to Ohio to interrogate Thompkins.19 At the start of the
interrogation, Detective Christopher Helgert presented Thompkins
with a form containing the Miranda warning.20 To ensure that he
could read and understand English, Helgert asked Thompkins to read
aloud the fifth warning on the form.21 Thompkins complied.22 Helgert
read the remaining warnings aloud and asked Thompkins to sign the
form to indicate that he understood his rights.23 Thompkins declined
to sign the form.24 There is conflicting evidence as to whether
Thompkins verbally confirmed that he understood his rights.25
The interrogation took place in a room that was eight feet by ten
feet.26 Thompkins sat in a chair that resembled a school desk.27 After
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 2256.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The form stated:

NOTIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND STATEMENT
1. You have the right to remain silent.
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.
3. You have a right to talk to a lawyer before answering any questions and you have
the right to have a lawyer present with you while you are answering any questions.
4. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before
any questioning, if you wish one.
5. You have the right to decide at any time before or during questioning to use your
right to remain silent and your right to talk with a lawyer while you are being
questioned.
Id.
21. Id.; see supra note 20.
22. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Helgert testified at a suppression hearing that he “believe[d] [he] asked [Thompkins] if
he understood the Rights, and [Helgert thought he] got a verbal answer to that as a ‘yes.’” Id. at
2267 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). At trial, however, Helgert said, “I don’t know that I orally
asked” Thompkins whether he understood his rights. Id.
26. Id. at 2256 (majority opinion).
27. Id.
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the interrogation began, at no time did Thompkins say that he did not
want to talk with the police, that he wanted to remain silent, or that
he wanted to speak with an attorney.28 During the interrogation, the
officers asked Thompkins numerous questions and conveyed to him
that this was his opportunity to tell his side of the story.29 Thompkins,
however, remained largely silent.30 He gave a few limited responses,
such as “Yeah,” “No,” or “I don’t know,” and occasionally nodded
his head or made eye contact.31 At one point, he communicated that
he “didn’t want a peppermint” and that the chair he was “sitting in
was hard.”32 After about two hours and forty-five minutes, Helgert
asked Thompkins, “Do you believe in God?”33 Thompkins made eye
contact with Helgert, and, with tears in his eyes, responded, “Yes.”34
Helgert then asked, “Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting
that boy down?”35 He responded, “Yes,” and looked away.36
Thompkins refused to sign a written confession, and the interrogation
ended approximately fifteen minutes later.37
Before his jury trial, Thompkins made a motion to suppress the
statements made during the interrogation under Miranda,38 claiming
a violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.39
He claimed he had invoked his right to remain silent by actually
remaining silent, and that in any event, he had not waived that right.40
The trial court denied the motion.41 The jury subsequently convicted
Thompkins of first-degree murder.42
Thompkins appealed the trial court’s refusal to suppress his
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id. at 2267 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2256 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2256–57.
Id. at 2257.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2257.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2258.
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pretrial statements.43 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
found that while a waiver of the right to remain silent may be
implied through a “course of conduct indicating waiver,”44
Thompkins’s “persistent silence for nearly three hours” indicated a
course of conduct that strongly suggested that Thompkins did not
waive his right to remain silent.45
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. Majority Opinion
Under Miranda, for statements made by a suspect during a
custodial interrogation to be admissible against him at trial, the
police must give the suspect a warning advising him of his rights.46
The warning must advise the suspect that he has the right to remain
silent and the right to the presence of an attorney.47 If at any time
during the interrogation, the suspect invokes either of these rights—
for example by stating that he wants to speak to an attorney or that he
does not want to answer questions—the interrogation must cease.48
However, even if the suspect does not clearly invoke his rights and
the interrogation continues, any statements made during the
investigation are inadmissible absent a knowing and voluntary
waiver of those rights.49
1. Whether Thompkins Invoked His Right to Remain Silent
Thompkins argued that he invoked his right to remain silent by
not saying anything for a sufficient period of time, and therefore all
questioning should have ceased.50 In an opinion authored by Justice
Kennedy, a majority of the Court rejected this argument.51
The Court acknowledged that when a suspect invokes his right
43.
44.
45.
(2010).
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).
Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572, 588 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2250
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
Id.
See id.
Butler, 441 U.S. at 373.
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259 (2010).
Id.
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to counsel or his right to remain silent police must “scrupulously
honor[]” this request by terminating the interrogation.52 In Davis v.
United States,53 the Court held that a suspect who wishes to invoke
his right to counsel must do so unambiguously.54 A suspect’s
ambiguous request for counsel does not trigger his right to cut off
questioning.55 Furthermore, police officers do not have to ask any
clarifying questions to determine whether the suspect’s ambiguous
statement is in fact an attempt to invoke his rights.56
The Court in Thompkins, for the first time, squarely addressed
the issue of whether the unambiguous invocation rule from Davis
applies with equal force to the invocation of the right to remain
silent.57 The Court in this case, finding no principled reason to adopt
a different standard, extended the rule in Davis to the right to remain
silent.58 Therefore, unless the suspect unambiguously invokes his
right to remain silent by clearly saying either that he does not want to
talk to the police or that he wants to remain silent, the police are not
required to cut off questioning.59
A rule requiring an unambiguous invocation of the right to
remain silent, the Court reasoned, presents the police with clear
guidance as to whether it is proper to proceed with an interrogation.60
If the rule were otherwise, it would require the police to make
difficult decisions regarding whether the suspect had invoked his
rights, and a suspect’s voluntary confession could potentially be
suppressed “if they guess wrong.”61 This hypothetical result, the
Court concluded, would place a “significant burden on society’s
interest in prosecuting criminal activity.”62
Thompkins did not make any clear statements to the police that
52. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479).
53. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
54. Id. at 459.
55. Id. (finding that suspect’s statement “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer” did not constitute
an unambiguous invocation of right to counsel).
56. Id. at 461–62.
57. Berguis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010).
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting Davis, 540 U.S. at 461) (citations omitted).
62. Id.
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he wished to remain silent.63 Therefore, Thompkins did not invoke
his right to remain silent, and the police were not required to cut off
questioning.64
2. Whether Thompkins Waived His Right to Remain Silent
Even if Thompkins did not invoke his right to remain silent his
statements could not be used against him unless he “knowingly and
voluntarily waived” his rights.65 “The question of whether a suspect
has validly waived his right is ‘entirely distinct’ as a matter of law
from whether he invoked that right.”66 Therefore, finding that
Thompkins did not invoke his right to remain silent, the Court turned
its analysis to whether he had validly waived that right.
The prosecution bears a “heavy burden” to show the suspect
waived his rights.67 However, it need not show that he expressly
waived his rights either orally or in writing.68 In North Carolina v.
Butler,69 the Court made it clear that waiver of the right to remain
silent may be implied through “the defendant’s silence, coupled with
an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating
waiver.”70 Because Thompkins did not expressly waive his rights in
writing or orally, the Court analyzed whether he had impliedly
waived them.
Relying on Butler’s implied-waiver rule, the Court held that if
the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning had been given, that
the suspect had understood his rights, and that he had made
incriminating, uncoerced statements, he had impliedly waived his
right to remain silent.71 According to the Court, this rule sufficiently
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)).
66. Id. at 2268 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984)
(per curiam)).
67. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.
157, 168 (1986) (construing “heavy burden” to require no more than a preponderance-of-theevidence standard).
68. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373.
69. 441 U.S. 369.
70. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2261 (quoting Butler, 441 U.S. at 373).
71. Id. at 2262 (“Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it
was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes implied waiver of
the right to remain silent.”).
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guarantees that a suspect “knowingly and voluntarily” waived his
rights.72 The majority reasoned that “[a]s a general proposition, the
law can presume that an individual who, with a full understanding of
his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise has
made a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights
afford.”73 As long as the prosecution can show that the suspect had
been advised that he had the right to remain silent and that he had
understood that right, the fact that he had spoken at all demonstrated
a deliberate choice to give up the right to remain silent. His actions
therefore constituted a “course of conduct indicating waiver.”74
Applying this rule to the facts on the record, the Court held that
Thompkins had knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights.75 The
Court found that there was no evidence that Thompkins had not
understood his rights, and he therefore had known what he was
giving up by speaking.76 In addition, the Court found that
Thompkins’s response to Helgert’s questions about whether he
prayed to God for forgiveness for shooting the victim, coupled with
the sporadic answers he had given throughout the interview,
constituted a “course of conduct indicating waiver.”77 Therefore,
Thompkins’s inculpatory responses were admissible at trial.
B. Dissent
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, dissented. The dissent addressed the issue of waiver first.
Emphasizing the prosecution’s heavy burden to prove waiver, it
found that the state had not met that burden.78 The dissent centered
its argument on the principle announced in Miranda and affirmed in
Butler, that “a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the
silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the
fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.”79 The dissent
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See id.
Id.
See id. at 2263.
Id. at 2262.
Id.
Id. at 2263 (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)).
Id. at 2268 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2269; Butler, 441 U.S. at 373; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
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concluded that these precedents clearly favored a finding that the
prosecution had not met its “heavy burden” to prove Thompkins had
waived his constitutional right against self-incrimination.80
The dissent criticized the majority’s opinion as flatly
contradicting the long-standing precedent that waiver must not be
presumed simply because a confession was eventually obtained.81 It
viewed the opinion as announcing an unnecessarily broad new
principle of law that “an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes
an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”82 This decision,
according to the dissent, takes an “unprecedented step away” from
the high standards of proof required to prove waiver of constitutional
rights.83 Furthermore, the decision undermines the important interest
in preventing a coercive and inquisitorial criminal justice system
against which the Miranda warnings were designed to protect.84
The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s new rule
requiring a suspect to clearly assert his right to silence.85 The dissent
found the majority’s decision to extend the unambiguous invocation
rule from Davis particularly problematic in light of the lessened
burden on the prosecution to show waiver.86 Taken together, the new
implied-waiver rule and the “novel clear-statement rule for
invocation invite[] police to question a suspect at length—
notwithstanding his persistent refusal to answer questions—in the
hope of eventually obtaining a single inculpatory response which
will suffice to prove waiver of rights.”87
Instead of extending this unambiguous assertion rule to the right
to remain silent, the dissent would have applied a more precautionary
and fact-specific standard, set forth in Michigan v. Mosley88 that
requires that a suspect’s “right to cut off questioning” has been
“scrupulously honored.”89 This standard, the dissent argues, would
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2271 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2273.
Id.
Id.
Id.
423 U.S. 96 (1975).
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2275 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Mosley, 423 U.S. at
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accommodate a fact-specific scenario in which a suspect’s silence
could be interpreted differently under different circumstances.90 On
the other hand, a suspect’s silence throughout a prolonged
interrogation should not be understood as anything other than an
invocation of the right to remain silent, and under such
circumstances the police would be required to terminate the
interrogation.91 This standard, the dissent argues, is the more faithful
application of the Court’s precedents than the majority’s
unnecessarily broad extension of Davis.92
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Requiring an Unambiguous Assertion of the Right to Remain
Silent Undermines the Suspect’s Ability to Effectively Assert
His Rights During Intimidating Interrogations
Prior to the Court’s decision in Thompkins, nine of eleven circuit
courts had either already required that a suspect unambiguously
assert his right to remain silent or had held that such a requirement
would not be an unreasonable application of federal law. However,
the decision in Thompkins represents the first time the Supreme
Court itself squarely addressed the issue. The Court held that a
suspect only invokes his right to remain silent by making an
unambiguous statement to that effect.93 With this decision, the Court
set a new lower constitutional floor for the protection against selfincrimination.
The question of whether a suspect has invoked his right to
remain silent is significant because once a suspect has invoked that
right the police must “scrupulously honor[]” that request by
immediately ceasing the interrogation.94 However, unless or until the
suspect invokes his rights, the police may continue with the
interrogation unimpeded.95
104).
90. Id. at 2275–76.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2278.
93. Id. at 2260 (majority opinion).
94. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103–04 (1975) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479
(1966)).
95. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994).
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While the Miranda Court held that a suspect may assert his right
to remain silent and his right to counsel “in any manner,”96 the Court
subsequently retreated from this position in Davis.97 That case, which
specifically addressed only the invocation of the right to counsel,
held that a suspect must unambiguously request counsel for police
questioning to cease.98 After Davis, anything short of a clear
statement expressing the desire for the assistance of counsel will not
be honored.99 The statement found to be ambiguous in Davis was
“Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.”100 The Davis Court further held
that while it may be good police practice, the interrogating officer is
under no obligation to clarify whether the suspect actually wants an
attorney.101 Therefore, it is of some moment that the Court in
Thompkins unequivocally decided to extend this requirement of
unambiguous invocation to the right to remain silent.
The application of the Davis requirement to the right to remain
silent may not seem particularly problematic under the facts of
Thompkins. Indeed, the suspect made no affirmative statement
indicating that he did not want to speak with the police; he merely
remained largely silent, gave intermittent one-word answers,
occasionally nodded his head, and sometimes made eye contact.102 It
may therefore seem proper, in the interest of effective law
enforcement, to allow an interrogation to continue absent a clear
indication that a suspect does not wish to speak with the police.
However, there are several types of statements that could be
construed as ambiguous that likely reflect a suspect’s ultimately
unsuccessful attempt to assert his right to remain silent.103 For
example, suspects often make statements such as “I might not want
to talk,”104 or “I don’t want to talk now.”105 When a suspect makes
96. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45.
97. 512 U.S. 452.
98. Id. at 459.
99. See id. at 461–62.
100. Id. at 455.
101. Id. at 461–62.
102. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2256–57 (2010).
103. See Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: Reconsidering the Invocation of the Right to
Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 773, 787–88 (2009) (listing eight
different categories of statements that could constitute an “ambiguous” assertion of the right to
remain silent).
104. Id. at 789.
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these types of uncertain, ambiguous statements, it is “at least as
plausible, if not more plausible, that [the] suspect . . . is, albeit
imperfectly, attempting to invoke one or more rights.”106
Furthermore, by extension from Davis, interrogators will be at liberty
to completely ignore any ambiguous indication of a desire to remain
silent and will have no obligation to clarify whether the suspect
wishes to speak.107
The Miranda Court was concerned with the “inherently
compelling pressures” of the in-custody interrogation when it
announced its prophylactic rule.108 However, it is exactly those
pressures at work that make the unambiguous-assertion requirement
so problematic. Faced with the intimidating specter of police
interrogation, a suspect may falter in his language and fail to
unambiguously assert his desire to remain silent. Furthermore, the
intimidated suspect’s uncertain statement may be completely ignored
by the interrogators, further contributing to the imbalance of power
in the interrogation room.
B. The Court’s New Rule Regarding Implied Waiver
Is a Striking Departure from Its Own Precedent
As discussed above, if a suspect does not properly invoke his
rights with a clear statement, the police may continue the
interrogation. However, if the interrogation continues and the suspect
makes inculpatory statements, the prosecution must still meet its
burden to show that the suspect validly waived his rights before using
his statements against him at trial.109 “The question whether a suspect
has validly waived his right is ‘entirely distinct’ as a matter of law
from whether he invoked that right.”110 In other words, even if a
suspect fails to unambiguously invoke his right to silence and
thereby terminate the interrogation, he must waive his right against
self-incrimination before his statements may be used against him.111
105. Id. at 794.
106. Id. at 804.
107. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1994).
108. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
109. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010).
110. Id. at 2268 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S 91, 98 (1984)
(per curiam)).
111. Id. at 2260 (majority opinion).
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As the Miranda Court held, the burden on the prosecution to
show that the suspect knowingly and intelligently waived his
privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel is a
heavy one.112 A central principle announced in the Miranda decision,
which subsequent Supreme Court decisions have affirmed, is that “a
valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the
accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a
confession was in fact eventually obtained.”113 Therefore, the fact
that after a defendant has been read his rights he remains silent and
does not immediately assert his rights is not sufficient to show that
he has waived those rights. In other words, a suspect’s failure to
immediately invoke his rights does not mean he has validly waived
his rights. The decision in Butler, which held for the first time that a
valid waiver need not be express but may be implied, echoed this
principle.114 The Court held that mere silence will not be enough to
support a finding of waiver, but that a suspect’s “silence, coupled
with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct
indicating waiver” may be sufficient to show implied waiver.115
While the Butler Court may have retreated from the principle
announced in Miranda that any waiver be “specifically made,”116 the
majority was careful to reiterate that there still must be a
presumption against waiver and that the prosecution’s burden to
show waiver is great.117 Furthermore, the Court indicated that it did
not intend for implied waiver to become the rule rather than the
exception by emphasizing that only in some cases will waiver be
clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person
interrogated.118
Purportedly relying on Butler’s implied-waiver rule, the
Thompkins Court announced a new formulation of that rule: “Where
the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it

112. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372–73 (1979); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
113. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475; see, e.g., Butler, 441 U.S. at 373 (reaffirming Miranda’s
principle that silence alone is not enough to constitute a valid waiver).
114. See Butler, 441 U.S. at 373.
115. Id.
116. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470.
117. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373.
118. Id.
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was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement
establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”119 The
Court couched its analysis in the Butler framework, but this new rule
is in fact a striking departure from the precedent it professes to rely
on.
While the Butler Court did not give the lower courts any
guidance for analyzing the circumstances in which words and actions
would clearly imply waiver, the particular facts of Butler provide
some guidance. In Butler, FBI agents gave the suspect a Miranda
warning, and he stated that he understood his rights.120 The FBI
agents informed him that he did not need to speak with them or sign
the waiver-of-rights form but that they would like to speak with
him.121 The suspect responded, “I will talk to you but I am not
signing any form.”122 He clearly indicated a willingness to engage in
a conversation with the police, which constituted a “course of
conduct indicating waiver.”123
Indeed, this course-of-conduct requirement has always required
something more than merely giving an inculpatory response to police
interrogators. Circuit courts and state courts alike have typically
found implied waiver only when a suspect expresses a willingness to
speak or readily engages in conversation with the police.124 In fact,
the Fifth Circuit, in a factual situation similar to that in Thompkins,
found no implied waiver because there had been no indication of any
willingness to talk and the only statement that the suspect had made
was the one being challenged.125 Notably, the court largely based its
holding on the idea that “the making of the inculpatory statement
119. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010).
120. Butler, 441 U.S. at 370–71.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 371.
123. Id. at 373.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Cardwell, 433 F.3d 378, 384, 389–90 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding
implied waiver when suspect initiated conversation with police and willingly answered
questions); Stawicki v. Israel, 778 F.2d 380, 382–84 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding implied waiver
when suspect asked to speak with the detective and then fully confessed to a murder); United
States v. Velasquez, 626 F.2d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that suspect’s willingness to
answer questions and oral acknowledgement that she understood her rights was sufficient to show
implied waiver); People v. Hawthorne, 205 P.3d 245, 260 (Cal. 2009) (finding implied waiver
when defendant was “eager” to participate in police interrogation).
125. McDonald v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 518, 521–22 (5th Cir. 1982).
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cannot alone indicate waiver.”126
Under the particular facts of Thompkins, it is arguable that the
suspect’s few one-word responses and sporadic eye contact
throughout the three-hour interrogation indicated some willingness to
speak with the police, and therefore perhaps implied a course of
conduct indicating waiver. However, the Court’s analysis did not
rely heavily on the sporadic answers Thompkins had given
throughout the interrogation to reach the conclusion that
Thompkins’s behavior showed a course of conduct indicating
waiver. The Court found that “Thompkins’s answer to Detective
Helgert’s question about whether Thompkins prayed to God for
forgiveness for shooting the victim is a ‘course of conduct indicating
waiver’ of the right to remain silent.”127 Therefore, the Court implied
that a suspect engages in a course of conduct indicating waiver
simply by making a one-word inculpatory statement.
This conclusion is in complete derogation of the principle firmly
announced in Miranda, reaffirmed in Butler, and even acknowledged
in the Thompkins decision itself—that “a valid waiver will not be
presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are
given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually
obtained.”128 As almost an afterthought, the Court added that this
conclusion is “confirmed” by the fact that Thompkins had given
sporadic answers to questions throughout the interrogation.129
Therefore, the Court seems to suggest that there is a valid waiver the
minute an inculpatory statement is made, and any waiver-indicating
conduct in addition to the inculpatory statement merely bolsters that
conclusion but is not necessary to it. The Court supports its
conclusory reasoning with the very general principle that when a
suspect who, understanding his rights, acts in a manner inconsistent
with the exercise of those rights, that suspect has made a deliberate
choice to relinquish the protection of those rights.130 Therefore,
because Thompkins knew that he had the right to remain silent, the
one-word response elicited after two hours and forty-five minutes of
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 522.
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2263 (2010) (emphasis added).
Id. at 2261; Butler, 441 U.S. at 373; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263.
Id. at 2262.
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one-sided interrogation is conduct that is inconsistent with the
exercise of that right, and therefore clearly indicates the deliberate
relinquishment of its protections.
Even if the Court did in fact rely on Thompkins’s sporadic
statements as part of the course of conduct indicating waiver, further
analysis of those statements’ nature reveals that reliance on them is
misplaced. The only two actual statements Thompkins made were
that he “didn’t want a peppermint” and that the chair he was “sitting
in was hard.”131 These statements are completely unrelated to the
offense for which he was being questioned. They do not relate to the
shooting in any manner. It is anomalous to suggest that
communication with the police about matters completely unrelated to
the offense—and that are not possibly incriminating—indicates a
willingness to waive one’s right against self-incrimination.
V. CONCLUSION
The Miranda Court introduced a rule that gave broad protections
for suspects against the inherently compelling nature of in-custody
interrogations. The interrogators could not continue questioning a
suspect if he asserted his rights “in any manner,” and if interrogation
did continue, there was a “heavy burden” on the prosecution to show
that a waiver had been “specifically made.”
The cases that followed Miranda chipped away at these central
principles. The Davis Court decided that a suspect must
unambiguously assert his right to counsel to cut off questioning
rather than being able to do so “in any manner.” The Butler Court
held that waiver did not need to be “specifically made,” but could be
implied through the defendant’s course of conduct. The Thompkins
decision is no exception to this trend of retreating from Miranda’s
broad principles.
Today, a suspect’s persistent silence in the face of questioning
will not invoke his right to remain silent and will not cut off
questioning. Therefore a suspect may sit in an interrogation room—
saying nothing in response to repeated and persistent questioning by
the police over a period of hours—and the interrogation can continue
without pause.
131. Id. at 2257.
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Furthermore, before Thompkins even if the defendant’s silence
were not sufficient to invoke his right to remain silent, an extended
period of silence might at least militate against a finding of implied
waiver. After Thompkins, such silence is presumably irrelevant so
long as the suspect at some point says something incriminating. If at
hour three, a suspect’s silence is broken and he finally makes an
inculpatory one-word response to the interrogator, he has
deliberately relinquished his constitutional protections against selfincrimination. The new rules announced in this decision directly
undermine the original purpose of the Miranda warnings—to protect
suspects against the coercive pressures of custodial interrogation. As
Justice Sotomayor noted in her dissent, “[r]equiring proof of a course
of conduct beyond the inculpatory statements themselves is critical
to ensuring that those statements are voluntary admissions and not
the dubious product of an overborne will.”132

132. Id. at 2272–73 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

1196

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1179

